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The Multiethnic Placement Act: Threat to
Foster Child Safety and Wellbeing
David J. Herring
Abstract
Despite the efforts of public officials to reduce the time children spend in foster
care, many children live in foster homes for a substantial portion of their child-
hoods. In fact, a child placed in a foster home may remain in that home for an
extended period, with a significant possibility of remaining there permanently. In
light of this situation, the decision to place a child in a particular foster home is
extremely important.
The federal Multiethnic Placement Act (MEPA) significantly affects foster care
placement decisions. This law expressly prohibits public child welfare agencies
from delaying or denying a child’s foster care or adoptive placement on the ba-
sis of race, color, or national origin. Federal officials have interpreted MEPA as
barring public agencies from routinely and systematically considering race when
placing children in particular foster homes. In other words, MEPA precludes these
agencies from pursuing children’s interests through a policy or practice of match-
ing a child’s race with that of his or her foster parent.
To date, commentators who have examined MEPA have focused their attention
on identifying and weighing the benefits and harms of transracial adoption for mi-
nority children and communities. As a consequence, they have not addressed the
impact of MEPA on foster care placement decisions in any detail.
In contrast, this article examines foster care placement decisions. More specif-
ically, this article uses behavioral biology research on kinship cues and social
psychology research on in-group favoritism to formulate a hypothesis that has im-
plications for MEPA’s prohibition on the routine consideration of race in making
foster care placement decisions. Namely, children placed with non-kin, same-race
foster parents are likely to be safer and healthier than children placed with non-
kin, different-race foster parents. The article calls for a test of this hypothesis,
explains how such a test may proceed, and discusses possible implications for law
and policy addressing race and foster care.




Despite the efforts of public officials to reduce the time children spend in foster care,
many children live in foster homes for a substantial portion of their childhoods.1 In order to
improve conditions for these children, it is necessary to understand the dynamics of the foster
parent/foster child relationship. Findings from behavioral biology and social psychology
research are helpful in addressing this need.2 This article uses this research to formulate a
* Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law.
1 See U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families,
Children’s Bureau, The AFCARS Report—Preliminary FY 2005 Estimates as of September
2006 at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/stats_research/afcars/tar/report 1(2006) [hereinafter
the AFCARS Report] (Revealing that 37% of the 513,000 children in foster care had spent more
than two years in foster care placements, with 15% having spent five years or more.). See also
Fred Wulczyn, Closing the Gap: Are Changing Exit Patterns Reducing the Time African
American Children Spend in Foster Care Relative to Caucasian Children, 25 CHILD. & YOUTH
SERVICES REV. 431 (2003); Brenda D. Smith, After Parental Rights are Terminated: Factors
Associated with Exiting Foster Care, 25 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVICES REV. 965 (2003); Susan P.
Kemp & Jami M. Bodonyi, Beyond Termination: Length of Stay and Predictors of Permanency
for Legally Free Children, 81 CHILD WELFARE 58 (2002).
2 See, e.g., Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law: An Introduction and Application to
Child Abuse, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1117 (1997); David J. Herring, Foster Care Safety and the Kinship
Cue of Attitude Similarity, 7 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 355 (2006) [hereinafter Attitude
Similarity]; David J. Herring, Foster Care Placement: Reducing the Risk of Sibling Incest, 37
MICH. J. L. REFORM 1145 (2004); David J. Herring, Child Placement Decisions: The Relevance
of Facial Resemblance and Biological Relationships, 43 JURIMETRICS J. 387 (2003) [hereinafter
Facial Resemblance].
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hypothesis that has implications for the current prohibition on the routine consideration of race in
making foster care placement decisions.3 Namely, children placed with non-kin, same-race
foster parents are likely to be safer and healthier than children placed with non-kin, different-race
foster parents.
Since the 1970’s, federal law has been the dominant mechanism for reform of state public
child welfare systems.4 Although many assert that family matters are primarily subject to state
control, Congress has largely taken over state child welfare systems through the exercise of its
spending power. For example, if states want to receive federal funds for foster care
expenditures, they must comply with a set of federal statutes and regulations that dictate the
design of their child welfare systems.5 Because every state depends heavily on federal funds to
sustain their public child welfare systems, state laws, policies, and practices comply with federal
law, at least in form if not in operation.6
The construction of federal child welfare law proceeds primarily from permanency
planning concepts.7 These concepts have their origin in child development theory and social
3 See The Multiethnic Placement Act (MEPA), Pub. L. 103-382, § 551, 108 Stat. 4056 (1994)
[hereinafter MEPA] (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1996b (2000) and 42 U.S.C. § 5115a
(1994) (repealed 1996)).
4 See id.; The Adoption and Safe Families Act, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 671 et seq.); The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 671 et seq.).
5 See, e.g., id.; Robert M. Gordon, Drifting Through Byzantium: The Promise and Failure of the
Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 83 MINN. L. REV. 637 (1999).
6 See id.; David J. Herring, The Adoption and Safe Families Act—Hope and Its Subversion, 34
FAMILY L.Q. 329, 331-36 (2000).
7 See id. at 329-31; ANTHONY M. MALUCCIO ET AL., PERMANENCY PLANNING FOR CHILDREN:
CONCEPTS AND METHODS 5 (1986).
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work policy and practice.8 Their goal is to secure child wellbeing by having at least one adult
make a permanent commitment to care for and raise each child.9
Permanency planning concepts have significant implications for state actors in public
child welfare systems. Namely, these actors should be reluctant to disrupt an established
parent/child relationship. Intervention in family associations, especially interventions that
involve removal of children from parental custody, should occur only when necessary to protect
children from serious harm.10 In addition, if state actors must intervene, the period of
intervention should be as short as possible.11 For instance, if they must place a child in foster
care, state actors should return the child to parental custody as soon as a parent can provide
minimally adequate care. Because this is a strongly favored outcome, state actors should
actively provide services to the parent and child so that reunification can occur as soon as
possible.12 However, if state actors determine that a child’s parents will be unable to provide
minimally adequate care in time to meet the child’s developmental needs, they should secure an
alternative permanent placement as soon as possible. This could mean an adoption placement,
permanent guardianship, or another arrangement that results in an adult making a permanent
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Current federal law and the state laws that parrot it appear well designed to achieve
timely permanent placements for children while also securing child safety and health. Federal
law requires states to maintain systems that encourage and facilitate the reporting of child
maltreatment.14 Once state actors receive a report, they must investigate and take appropriate
action such as providing the subject family with support services or removing a child from
parental custody.15 If they remove a child, state actors must make efforts to return the child to
the parents as soon as possible unless the particular family’s circumstances are egregious.16
While making reunification efforts, state actors’ paramount concern must be the child’s safety
and health.17
In addition, an administrative or judicial officer must review the affected family’s
situation at least every six months while the child remains out of parental custody.18 This officer
must determine if the state child welfare agency is making reasonable efforts to return the child
to the parent and formulating appropriate plans for the child’s future.19 The state must provide a
permanency hearing at the time a child has been out of parental custody for twelve months.20
The presiding officer must ensure that the state agency has an appropriate plan to achieve a
14 42 U.S.C. § 5106f-1 (2003).
15 See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (1994) (calling for states to require public child welfare agencies to
make reasonable efforts to maintain or reunify a child’s family of origin).
16 Id.
17 Id. § 671(a)(15)(A).
18 Id. § 671(a)(16).
19 Id.
20 Id. § 675(5)(c).
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timely permanent placement for the child.21 Once a child has been in foster care for 15 of the
past 22 months, the state agency must petition a court to terminate parental rights unless the child
is living with kin, termination would clearly not serve the child’s best interests, or the state has
failed to make adequate reunification efforts.22 If the court grants the petition, state actors must
make efforts to secure a permanent placement for the child, with adoption being the favored
outcome.23
Through this process of case review, the law seeks to secure an affected child’s safety
and health while also achieving a timely permanent placement for the child. If effectively
implemented, this legal scheme should reduce the number of cases in which state actors remove
a child from parental custody. Removal would occur only after state actors have provided an
affected family with appropriate public services and only when necessary to protect a child from
a significant risk of serious harm. In addition, children whom the state must remove from
parental custody should exit their temporary foster care placements within 6 to 24 months.24
In light of these expectations, one could reasonably predict a significant reduction in the
number of children residing in foster care. Thus, statistics concerning the nation’s foster care
population constitute one measure of the effectiveness of the federal legal scheme.25
Unfortunately, the foster care statistics reveal the failure of federal child welfare law.
The number of children living in foster care has grown steadily during recent years.26 There are
21 Id.
22 Id. § 675(5)(E).
23 Id.
24 See generally Gordon, supra note 5; Kemp & Bodonyi, supra note 1; Smith, supra note 1.
25 See Kemp & Bodonyi, supra note 1.
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now well over half a million children living in temporary placements.27 And it should be noted
that these placements are not so temporary, with many children spending more than two years in
foster care.28
Even the extreme measure of terminating parental rights has not addressed this latter
problem. Many children are now legal orphans, having been freed for adoption without the
prospect of joining new families anytime soon, if ever.29 Making matters worse is the
demographic profile of children who live in foster care. They are disproportionally from poor,
minority families.30 Living in poverty within a minority community appears to significantly
increase the risk of spending a substantial portion of childhood in foster care.31
Governmental actors have failed to adequately support and effectively implement a well-
intentioned, well-designed child welfare legal scheme.32 The current reality is that a substantial
number of children (especially minority children) spend a significant amount of time in
temporary foster care placements. Accordingly, focusing exclusively on family preservation and
permanency planning, while ignoring conditions in foster care, eliminates viable opportunities to
26 Id.
27 The AFCARS Report, supra note 1.
28 Id.
29 See Smith, supra note 1; Kemp & Bodonyi, supra note 1.
30 See Wulczyn, supra note 1, at 431, 433; DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR
OF CHILD WELFARE (2002).
31 Id.
32 See Gordon, supra note 5; Herring, supra note 6.
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improve children’s lives. In order to seize these opportunities, public officials must realize that
one aspect of the child welfare system calls out for their attention—foster care.33
Because many children will spend a great deal of time growing up in foster care, the
decision to place a child in a particular foster home is extremely important.34 In fact, a child
33 Many aspects of the current conditions faced by children in foster care are problematic. After
experiencing the trauma of maltreatment and removal from parental custody, these children
experience a high level of instability. For example, a recent study found that a cohort of children
in foster care from 1990 to 1992 in San Diego experienced an average of more than 4 different
placements during an 18 month period, with the number of placements ranging form 1 to 15.
James, infra note 195, at 195. Another recent study of a cohort of children who had been placed
in foster care between 1988 and 1998 in Washington and Oregon found that these children
experienced an average of over 6 moves during their time in foster care. See Pecora et al., infra
note 34 at 26. Over 65% of these children spent more than 3.5 years in care. Id. at 27. (This is
largely consistent with national data indicating the average stay in foster care is more than 28
months. The AFCARS Report, supra note 1.) Almost one-third of the children experienced 10
or more school changes from elementary through high school, with 65% experiencing 7 or more
school changes. Pecora et al., infra note 34, at 28. The former foster children reported that a
significant number of their foster parents had been disengaged or authoritarian, expressing little
warmth. Id. at 30. Over 32% of the former foster children experienced some form of
maltreatment while in care (i.e. sexual abuse, physical abuse, or physical neglect). Id. at 31.
(This finding is consistent with other studies that have found a high level of maltreatment in
foster care. See Benedict et al., infra note 125; Chaifetz, infra note 125.) The study did find that
the former foster children had had access to a high level of education and therapeutic services,
but that many of these individuals experienced negative outcomes in terms of mental health,
employment, and finances. Pecora et al., infra note 34, at 28, 32-39. In light of these findings,
there are opportunities to improve conditions in foster care.
34 This is especially true in light of public agency efforts to achieve stable foster care placements.
See Peter J. Pecora et al., Improving Family Foster Care: Findings from the Northwest Foster
Care Alumni Study 25 (2005), available at http://www.casey.ord/NR/rdonlyres/
4E1E7C77-7624-4260-A253-892C5A6CB9E1/300/nw_alumni_study_full_apr2005.pdf (noting
the importance of and recommending placement stability). Because of these efforts, foster
children are likely to spend a significant period in a chosen foster home thus increasing the
stakes of a foster care placement decision for the placed child. Despite the importance of a foster
care placement decision, a team of researchers that investigated agency practices in placing
children in specific foster homes characterized the process as exhibiting institutional neglect.
See EMILY JEAN MCFADDEN & PATRICIA RYAN, Allegations of Maltreatment in Family Foster
Homes, in ASSESSING CHILD MALTREATMENT REPORTS 209, 213 (Michael Robin ed., 1991);
James A. Rosenthal et al., A Descriptive Study of Abuse and Neglect in Out-of-Home Placement,
15 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 249, 251 (1991). Another group of researchers discussed the
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placed in a foster home may remain in that home for an extended period, with a significant
possibility of remaining there permanently.35
The federal Multiethnic Placement Act (MEPA) significantly affects foster care
placement decisions.36 This law prohibits public child welfare agencies from delaying or
denying a child’s foster care or adoptive placement on the basis of the child’s or the prospective
parent’s race, color, or national origin.37 Public agencies cannot routinely and systematically
realities of the foster care system in an attempt to explain their findings that a significant portion
of reports of abuse and neglect in foster care involves serious incidents:
Dynamics in family foster care demonstrate the interaction of multiple
causal factors. Low pay leads to shortages in foster homes. These shortages
create pressure to license marginal homes. Pressures to place children in the least
restrictive setting direct difficult, behaviorally disturbed children into family
foster care. Large caseloads mitigate against adequate supportive services by
foster care workers. Inevitably, an overstrained family helps out in a crisis. [For
example,] perhaps two abused children need emergency short-term placement.
As no other placements are available, the short-term placements [sic] extends on.
These events combine with stress in the family home—perhaps the husband is
laid off at work—to create a tension-filled setting. A foster child reacts to this
tension with provoking behavior and is abused. The children are removed, placed
in another home, and a similar cycle repeats. The county investigation assigns
blame to the foster family. Id. at 257-58.
This description identifies the frequent failure of agencies to carefully match children with foster
parents and homes. In current practice, the availability of a bed for the child often appears to be
the driving force in making placement decisions. The placement process is often haphazard,
leaving a great deal of room for improvement. See id. For a more extensive discussion of this
process, see Facial Resemblance, supra note 2, at 401-05.
35 It is important to note that a significant portion of these children effectively, if not formally,
will be permanently placed with their foster parents. For example, the adoption of foster
children by their foster parents is supported by public agencies and has grown dramatically. See
The AFCARS Report, supra note 1, at 11 (reporting that 60% of the children adopted from the
public foster care system during fiscal year 2005 were adopted by their foster parents).




consider race in placing a child in a particular foster home. In other words, the law precludes
these agencies from pursuing children’s best interests through a policy or practice that matches a
child’s race with that of a foster parent. Only in exceptional circumstances related to an
individual child’s demonstrated, specific need for a foster parent of a particular race does MEPA
allow an agency to consider race.38
A primary purpose of MEPA is to eliminate discrimination that lengthens the time that
minority children wait for adoption placements.39 Under the law, agencies cannot delay an
adoption placement in order to match the race of the child with that of the adoptive parent.
Because there is a shortage of minority adoptive parents,40 an expected result of MEPA is an
increase in the number of transracial adoptions,41 and to date, commentators have focused their
attention on identifying and weighing the benefits and harms of transracial adoption on minority
38 See U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and
Families, A Guide to the Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994 As Amended by the Interethnic
Adoption Provisions of 1996 (1998) [hereinafter “HHS Guide”) at http://www.acf/hhs.gov/
programs/cb/pubs/mepa94/mepachp1.htm, at 2.
39 See id.; Devon Brooks et al., Adoption and Race: Implementing the Multiethnic Placement Act
and the Interethnic Adoption Provisions, 44 SOC. WORK 167 (1999).
40 See Devon Brooks et al., Preferred Characteristics of Children in Need of Adoption: Is There
a Demand for Available Foster Children?, 76 SOC. SERVICE REV. 575, 577 (2002); Richard P.
Barth, Effects of Age and Race on the Odds of Adoption versus Remaining in Long-Term Out-of-
Home Care, 76 CHILD WELFARE 285 (1997).
41 See ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY’S CHILDREN: ABUSE AND NEGLECT, FOSTER DRIFT, AND
THE ADOPTION ALTERNATIVE 182 (1999); Sarah Ramsey, Fixing Foster Care or Reducing Child
Poverty: The Pew Commission Recommendations and the Transracial Adoption Debate, 66
MONTANA L. REV. 21, 40-46 (2005); Brooks et al., supra note 40, at 577.
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children and communities.42 As a consequence, they have not addressed the impact of MEPA on
foster care placement decisions in any detail.
Findings from behavioral biology and social psychology research that investigates
kinship cues and in-group favoritism provide reasons to suspect that a prohibition on the
consideration of race affects child safety and wellbeing in foster care.43 This article will examine
this research and explore its implications for MEPA’s prohibition on the consideration of race in
making foster care placement decisions. Part II discusses MEPA’s development, current
provisions, and implementation. Part III describes the debate surrounding MEPA—a debate
primarily focused on transracial adoption placements. Part IV presents a hypothesis concerning
MEPA’s possible impact on child safety and wellbeing in foster care. Part IV also calls for a test
of the hypothesis, explains how such a test may proceed, and discusses possible implications for
law and policy addressing race and foster care.
II. The Multiethnic Placement Act
Congress enacted MEPA in 1994 in response to the widespread practice of placing
children with foster or adoptive parents of the same race and a separate set of practices that
42 See, e.g., BARTHOLET, supra note 41; RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX,
MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND ADOPTION (2003); Ruth-Arlene W. Howe, Transracial Adoption
(TRA): Old Prejudices and Discrimination Float Under a New Halo, 6 B. U. PUB. INT. L.J. 409
(1997); Carla Bradley & Cynthia G. Hawkins-León, The Transracial Adoption Debate:
Counseling and Legal Implications, 80 J. COUNS. & DEV. 433 (2002): Devon Brooks & Richard
P. Barth, Adult Transracial and Inracial Adoptees: Effects of Race, Gender, Adoptive Family
Structure, and Placement History on Adjustment Outcomes, 69 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 87
(1999).
43 See notes 94-207, infra and the accompanying text.
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discouraged minority individuals from serving as foster or adoptive parents.44 These latter
practices contributed to a shortage of minority foster and adoptive parents.45 As a result, it was
very difficult for many public agencies to place children with same-race foster or adoptive
parents. Minority children frequently had to live in a temporary placement while the agency
sought a same-race home. This wait could last a considerable time, allowing a child to form a
strong bond with a temporary caretaker such as a different-race foster parent. When this
occurred, the agency would eventually have to disrupt an established family bond when it
secured a same-race placement.46 In many other cases, agencies failed to secure a same-race
adoptive family, effectively denying affected children a permanent placement.47
Some members of Congress believed this situation of delay and failure surrounding the
placement of minority children in foster and adoptive homes harmed affected children.48
Lawmakers perceived public agencies as failing to promote the best interests of minority
children by effectively denying them timely placements in permanent homes. They passed
44 See HHS Guide, supra note 38, at 1-4; Brooks et al., supra note 40.
45 See id.; HHS Guide, supra note 38.
46 Id. at 3-4.
47 See id.; Martin Guggenheim, The Effects of Recent Trends to Accelerate the Termination of
Parental Rights of Children in Foster Care, 29 FAM. L.Q. 121 (1995).
48 HHS Guide, supra note 38.
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MEPA in order to prohibit agencies from using race, color, or national origin49 to delay or deny a
child’s placement in a particular foster or adoptive home.50
Originally, MEPA expressly permitted agencies to consider race as one of a number of
factors in assessing a child’s best interests and the capacity of prospective foster or adoptive
parents to meet the child’s needs.51 An agency could not delay or deny a placement solely on the
basis of race, but in making a placement decision an agency could routinely consider race as one
relevant factor among many. In 1996, Congress amended this provision of MEPA.52 The
current version of MEPA prohibits agencies from routinely considering race as one of many
factors relevant to a placement decision.53
The Administration of Children and Families of the United States Department of Health
and Human Services has issued a guide to MEPA.54 Federal officials intend the guide to “assist
49 For purposes of this article, the word “race” stands for the broader statutory phrase “race,
color, or national origin.”
50 MEPA, supra note 3; HHS Guide, supra note 38. MEPA also requires agencies to make
diligent efforts to recruit minority foster and adoptive parents. Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id. The HHS Guide states that “on rare occasions, the distinctive needs of an individual child
may warrant the consideration of the child’s race, color, or national origin.” The Guide makes it
clear that the use of racial or ethnic factors is permitted only in “exceptional circumstances
where the special or distinctive needs of a child require it and where those needs can be
documented or substantiated.”
54 HHS Guide, supra note 38.
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states and child welfare agencies in their efforts to comply with the new federal mandates
concerning the role of race, color, and national origin in foster care and adoptive placements.”55
In the guide, federal officials present their view of foster care placement practices prior to
the enactment of MEPA. They note that public agencies had generally favored placing children
with families of the same race. These agencies had considered transracial placements as a last
resort, acceptable only in unusual circumstances.56
Federal officials also articulate their view of the reasoning used by agencies to justify the
race matching approach. Agency officials believe that children have special needs because of
their immutable racial characteristics, as well as because of their cultural experiences.57 Agency
officials also believe that agencies should place children with adult caretakers who can fully
address these race-based needs.58 Federal officials conclude their description of the rationale for
race matching,
Just as it was assumed that most prospective parents want children who resemble
them, it was assumed that children would be uncomfortable in an adoptive family
that did not have a similar racial or ethnic heritage. It was alleged that children
raised in racially or ethnically matched families would more easily develop self
esteem and a strong racial identity, and that minority children would have the best
opportunity to learn the skills needed to cope with racism they were likely to
encounter as they grew up in American society.59
55 Id. at 1. State officials have a significant incentive to comply with MEPA because the law
provides for the withholding of federal funds and the right of any aggrieved individual to seek
relief in federal court against a state or other entity alleged to be in violation. MEPA, supra note
3; HHS Guide, supra note 38.
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Apparently child welfare agencies had assumed that their race matching policies and
practices complied with federal law. Federal officials challenge this assumption, asserting that
both the Constitution and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act bar states and publicly-funded entities
from discriminatory practices such as systematically placing children in racially matched foster
care and adoptive homes.60 In their view, MEPA simply makes it clear that such placement
practices are to be reviewed under a strict scrutiny standard.61 Therefore, a state must have a
compelling interest that it is pursuing through race matching.62 In addition, the policy and
practice of race matching must be narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling interest.63
Therefore, a state agency cannot simply assume that every child’s best interests (arguably a
compelling state interest) call for a same-race placement.64 In other words, race matching cannot
be a routine practice. In the view of federal officials, routine race matching has always been
illegal and MEPA clarifies this point.65 The federal guide concludes its discussion of the law by
stating that MEPA,
encourages child welfare workers to make decisions on the basis of individualized
needs of each child, and renders suspect any placement decision based on
stereotypical thinking or untested generalizations about what children need. From





65 Id. Federal officials acknowledge that some courts had struggled with this issue and had
evaluated some racial classifications with less than strict scrutiny if public agencies intended to
promote diversity or remedy the effect of historic discrimination. However, in the view of
federal officials, the United States Supreme Court has applied the strict scrutiny standard to all
racial classifications, even those that are allegedly benign. Id.
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now on, it should be clear that any use of race, color, or ethnicity is subject to the
strict scrutiny standard of review, and that the use of racial or ethnic factors is
permitted, only in exceptional circumstances where the special or distinctive
needs of a child require it and where those needs can be documented or
substantiated.66
As to enforcement, federal officials note that MEPA authorizes the United States
Department of Health and Human Services to impose Title I fiscal penalties and Title IV-E
graduated financial penalties on offending states.67 In addition, MEPA expressly authorizes
private individuals who are adversely affected by a violation of the law to seek injunctive relief,
monetary damages, and attorneys’ fees in federal court.68 State officials are likely to view the
financial implications of these enforcement mechanisms as significant incentives to comply with
MEPA.69
III. The MEPA Debate
In the federal guide to MEPA, federal officials expressly acknowledge that their views
are controversial and that they cannot resolve the debate surrounding MEPA.70 In beginning
their discussion of this debate, federal officials identify two primary concerns Congress
addressed in passing MEPA. First, Congress was concerned about reports that child welfare
agencies were removing minority children from stable transracial foster homes in order to place
66 Id. at chapter 3, page 2.
67 Id. at chapter 2, pages 6-7; MEPA, supra note 3.
68 Id.
69 See HHS Guide, supra note 38, at chapter 2, pages 5-7.
70 Id. at 1.
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them with someone of the same race whom the children had never met.71 Second, Congress was
concerned with reports of child welfare agencies denying minority children timely adoptive
placements because of their prolonged efforts to find race-matched adoptive homes.72
In light of these congressional concerns, federal officials’ discussion of the controversy
surrounding MEPA primarily focuses on achieving timely permanent placements. In fact, their
discussion focuses almost exclusively on adoption. Although the guide alludes to the insistence
of proponents of race matching policies that agencies recruit a diverse pool of both foster and
adoptive parents (an issue that federal officials believe MEPA addresses),73 the remainder of the
discussion emphasizes adoption placements.74 In presenting their view of the controversy,
federal officials assert the superiority of adoption by referring to studies that indicate that
adopted children perform better on most outcome measures than do children who remain in
foster care.75
Federal officials then discuss the desirability of transracial adoption. Initially, they note
that critics of racial matching assert that no credible evidence supports the claim that transracial
adoption is harmful to children’s self-esteem, sense of racial identity, or ability to cope with
racism.76 Federal officials themselves then assert that transracial adoptees do as well as same-
71 Id. at chapter 3, page 1.
72 Id. The guide notes that some agencies required specific waiting periods during which they
would search for a same race placement or required caseworkers to justify a transracial
placement.






race adoptees in these areas, developing a positive sense of racial identity and having higher
educational attainments.77 They conclude the discussion on a positive note concerning race
relations,
There are some differences that manifest themselves over time between same-race
and transracial adoptive families. Among these is that transracial adoptees have a
more positive attitude about relations with whites, are more comfortable in
integrated and multiethnic settings, and do not consider race as basic to their self-
understanding as do most same-race adoptees.78
Federal officials perceive and embrace transracial adoption as an effective mechanism for
achieving a color-blind society.
Commentators who support the consideration of race in making placement decisions
disagree with federal officials’ views and conclusions.79 They also focus almost entirely on
permanent placements, especially the issues surrounding transracial adoptions.80 These
commentators raise methodological and analytical questions about studies that indicate that
transracial adoptees do not suffer developmental harm and turmoil, especially in relation to their
racial identity and sense of belonging.81 These opponents of transracial adoption also raise the
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 See Bradley & Hawkins-León, supra note 42; Brooks et al., supra note 39; Howe, supra note
42; Twila L. Perry, Power, Possibility and Choice: The Racial Identity of Transracially Adopted
Children, 9 MICH. J. RACE & L. 215 (2003); Ruth McRoy, Expedited Permanency, Implications
for African-American Children and Families, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 475 (2005); Margaret F.
Brinig, The Child’s Best Interests: A Neglected Perspective on Interracial Intimacies, 117
HARV. L. REV. 2129 (2004).
80 See, e.g., Brooks et al., supra note 39 (mentioning foster care, but primarily as a complicating
factor in achieving adoption); Howe, supra note 42; McRoy, supra note 79.
81 See Bradley & Hawkins-León, supra note 42, at 434-36; Sarah Ramsey, Fixing Foster Care or
Reducing Child Poverty: The PEW Commission Recommendations and the Transracial
Adoption Debate, 66 MONT. L. REV. 21, 42 (2005).
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prospect of harm to minority communities posed by transracial adoption.82 The majority, often
using the power of the state, devalues minority parents and communities, removing their children
and “saving” them through placement in a majority family.83 In the past, the National
Association of Black Social Workers has characterized this as “cultural genocide.”84
Because both sides in the debate surrounding MEPA focus on adoption policy, they
largely ignore foster care. Both proponents and critics of race matching simply demonize foster
care in passing:85 Foster care placements do harm, result in worse outcomes for children, and are
to be limited in duration as much as possible.86
However, as discussed previously, numerous children spend a substantial portion of their
childhood living in a foster home. For all intents and purposes, the foster home is their
childhood home, and the foster family is their family. This is the reality of the current public
child welfare system—a system that affects a disproportionate number of minority children.87
Several leading social work scholars have noted that the debate surrounding MEPA has
focused on transracial adoption despite the fact that MEPA regulates foster care placement
decisions as much as adoption decisions.88 These scholars view transracial adoption as a mere
82 See Howe, supra note 42; ROBERTS, supra note 30.
83 Id.; Howe, supra note 42.
84 ROBERTS, supra note 30, at 246-48.
85 See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 42; Brinig, supra note 79. See also Ramsey, supra note 81, at
39-44.
86 Id. at 42.
87 See supra notes 26-34 and accompanying text.
88 See Mark E. Courtney, The Politics and Realities of Transracial Adoption, 76 CHILD WELFARE
749 (1997); Brooks et al., supra note 40.
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distraction for child welfare officials who are attempting to secure child safety, wellbeing, and
permanency.89 There are not nearly enough white adoptive parents who would seriously pursue
the adoption of minority children living in foster care.90 Therefore, transracial adoption is
unlikely to be an effective mechanism for addressing the needs of these children.91 And all the
energy and effort expended in pursuing or resisting transracial adoption only diminishes the
resources available to effectively address the situation of these children and their families.92 For
example, public officials could be much more effective if they emphasized family support and
preservation programs, family reunification efforts, kinship care placements and support, and
foster care conditions and support.93
The latter possible area of emphasis raises the prospect of a close examination of
conditions in foster care. Such an examination would properly include an inquiry into the impact
of MEPA on foster care placement decisions shortly after a child is removed from parental
custody. Namely, how does the prohibition on the consideration of race at this point in a case
affect child safety and wellbeing in foster care? More specifically, does the failure to consider
race contribute to securing child safety and wellbeing? Conversely, would a consideration of
race lower the risk of harm faced by foster children? Raising such questions may provide a basis
for formulating testable hypotheses that could eventually contribute to the improvement of
89 See Courtney, supra note 88.
90 See id.; Brooks et al., supra note 40; Barth, supra note 40.
91 Courtney, supra note 88.
92 Id.
93 Id.
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conditions in foster care. In the next section, this article uses scientific research to formulate one
such hypothesis.
IV. MEPA and Foster Care Placement Decisions: The Formulation
of a Hypothesis
Research in the fields of behavioral biology and social psychology provides a basis for
the formulation of a hypothesis concerning race and foster care placements.94 Namely, children
are likely to experience less maltreatment and receive more favorable treatment in non-kin,
same-race foster placements than in non-kin, different-race foster placements.95
There are two primary lines of research that support this hypothesis. The first is
behavioral biology research addressing kinship cues.96 The second is social psychology research
examining in-group favoritism.97 The behavioral biology line of research arises from
evolutionary theory and the concept of inclusive fitness.98 Individuals who are biologically
related share a significant amount of genetic material that distinguishes them from other
members of their species.99 As a result, an individual can increase the amount of his or her
94 See, e.g., Attitude Similarity, supra note 2, at 388-90.
95 Id.
96 See, e.g., Steven M. Platek et al., Reactions to Children’s Faces: Resemblance Affects Males
More than Females, 23 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 159 (2002); Irene Bevc & Irwin Silverman,
Early Separation and Sibling Incest: A Test of the Revised Westermarck Theory, 21 EVOLUTION
& HUM. BEHAV. 151 (2000); Justin H. Park & Mark Schaller, Does Attitude Similarity Serve as a
Heuristic Cue for Kinship?, 26 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 158 (2004).
97 See infra notes 138-70 and accompanying text.




genetic material that passes on to future generations not only through his or her own reproductive
success, but also through the reproductive success of kin.100 In other words, an individual who
possesses a behavioral trait or inclination to assist kin in achieving reproductive success will be
more likely to maximize the amount of his or her genetic material present in future generations.
Accordingly, there has been and is significant natural selection pressure to possess the trait of
kinship altruism.101 In the end, an individual is likely to favor members of his or her kin group,
providing them with beneficial treatment that increases their reproductive success directly and
his or her reproductive success indirectly.102
A hypothetical may help to illustrate this point. [Consider illustration with life and death
situation (e.g. drowning)—sacrifice uncle’s life for nephew’s.] An individual has a twenty-two-
year-old nephew who is having great difficulty in securing employment. Although this
individual regularly refuses to use his professional connections to help young adults find a job,
he makes a series of phone calls on behalf of his nephew. Even though he does not know his
nephew well, he vouches for his intelligence and desire to work hard. In doing this, he risks
losing credibility with those with whom he works and conducts business—a loss that may
subsequently diminish his direct reproductive success. But he also provides potentially
substantial benefits to his nephew that may subsequently enhance his nephew’s reproductive
success. Because the uncle shares approximately 25 percent of his genetic material with his
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id. Justin H. Park et al., The Psychology of Human Kin Recognition: Heuristic Mechanisms
and Their Implications (2006) (Paper on file with the author p. 22-25).
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nephew,103 the uncle may increase his own reproductive success by favoring and assisting his
nephew in this way. If the nephew is more successful in producing children who possess some
of the uncle’s genetic material, the uncle will realize benefits in terms of his own reproductive
success. These potential benefits may outweigh the possible diminution of the uncle’s direct
reproductive success.104
Research on animal behavior has found a tendency to favor kin.105 Research on human
behavior has also found this tendency.106
In order for an individual to treat favorably others who are biologically related, the
individual must have the capacity to recognize kin. Kinship cues serve this function, constituting
cognitive heuristic mechanisms for the recognition of kin that often operate at an unconscious
level.107
103 See DAVID J. BULLER, ADAPTING MINDS 351-55 (2005).
104 See Trivers, supra note 98, at 113-14. Robert Trivers presents this concept in mathematical
form by asserting that an individual tends to provide benefits to another if the indirect benefit to
the donor’s reproductive success (B) multiplied by the degrees of relatedness (r) (25% in the
example in the text) is greater than the direct cost to the donor’s reproductive success (C)—
Br > C.
105 See id.; DAVID J. C. FLETCHER & CHARLES D. MICHENER, KIN RECOGNITION IN ANIMALS
(1987); Paul W. Sherman, Nepotism and the Evolution of Alarm Calls, 197 SCIENCE 1246
(1977).
106 See Eugene Burnstein, Christian Crandall & Shinobu Kitayama, Some Neo-Darwinian
Decision Rules for Altruism: Weighing Cues for Inclusive Fitness as a Function of the
Biological Importance of the Decision, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 773 (1994); Martin
Daly, Catherine Salmon & Margo Wilson, Kinship: The Conceptual Hole in Psychological
Studies of Social Cognition and Close Relationships, in EVOLUTIONARY SOC. PSYCHOL. 265
(Jeffrey A. Simpson & Douglas T. Kenrick eds., 1997); Daniel J. Kruger, Evolution and
Altruism: Combining Psychological Mediators with Naturally Selected Tendencies, 24




Behavioral biology researchers have identified several kinship cues such as facial
resemblance,108 attitude similarity,109 odor,110 and co-residence during early childhood.111 These
researchers have also explored the operation of kinship cues and the inclination to provide
beneficial treatment to kin.112 For example, researchers examining facial resemblance as a
kinship cue have conducted a series of studies using arrays of photographs of children’s faces
that include a photograph constructed by morphing a child’s face with that of the adult subject.113
The results of these studies indicate that adult subjects strongly favor a child who shares their
facial features.114
Some of these researchers have also found that this inclination is stronger in men than in
women.115 The researchers note that men face a higher degree of uncertainty surrounding their
biological relationship to a particular child, and therefore, an increased risk of misdirected
parental investment. In light of this paternity uncertainty, the researchers speculate that men rely
108 See Platek et al., supra note 96; Lisa M. DeBruine, Resemblance to Self Increases the Appeal
of Child Faces to Both Men and Women, 25 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 142 (2004).
109 See Park & Schaller, supra note 96.
110 See Richard H. Porter & John D. Moore, Human Kin Recognition by Olfactory Cues, 27
PHYSIOLOGY & BEHAV. 493 (1981); Glenn E. Weisfeld et al., Possible Olfaction-based
Mechanisms in Human Kin Recognition and Inbreeding Avoidance, 85 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD
PSYCHOL. 279 (2003).
111 See Bevc & Silverman, supra note 96.
112 See, e.g., Platek et al., supra note 96; Park & Schaller, supra note 96.
113 See Platek et al., supra note 96; DeBruine, supra note 108; Steven M. Platek et al., Reactions
to Children’s Faces: Males Are More Affected by Resemblance than Females Are, and So Are
Their Brains, 25 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 394 (2004).
114 Id.; DeBruine, supra note 108; Platek et al., supra note 96.
115 Id.; Platek et al., supra note 113.
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more heavily on facial resemblance to assure themselves that a particular child is biologically
related to them and to identify the child for favorable treatment.116 While the inclination to
provide favorable treatment to a child who resembles them is present in women, it is stronger in
men.117
Research examining attitude similarity as a kinship cue provides a second example.118
The findings indicate that an individual tends to favor others who share his or her attitudes.119 In
a recent study, researchers initially determined the attitudes of subjects as to ten items. They
then introduced the subjects to two women through photographs and descriptions of their
attitudes on the measured items. The women were comparable in terms of age and physical
features. However, one woman shared the attitudes of the subject, while the other did not.120
The researchers found that subjects favored the woman who shared their attitudes, exhibiting a
significantly stronger inclination to provide beneficial treatment to this woman in comparison to
the woman who did not share their attitudes. In addition, through careful design of the study, the
researchers determined that the positive feelings evoked by attitude similarity were not simply
116 Id.; Platek et al., supra note 96.
117 Id.; Platek et al., supra note 113. But see DeBruine, supra note 108 questioning the
differences between men and women in their reaction to children’s facial resemblance.
118 See Park & Schaller, supra note 96.
119 Id. See also D. Byrne et al., The Ubiquitous Relationship: Attitude Similarity and Attraction:
A Cross-Cultural Study, 24 HUM. REL. 201 (1971); Fang Fang Chen & Douglas T. Kenrick,
Repulsion or Attraction? Group Membership and Assumed Attitude Similarity, 83 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 111 (2002); Milton E. Rosenbaum, The Repulsion Hypothesis:
On the Nondevelopment of Relationships, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1156 (1986).
120 Park & Schaller, supra note 96, at 162-63.
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the result of general feelings of pleasantness. Instead, the subjects’ reactions to the profiles of
the two women arose independently from perceptions of kinship.121
The researchers also determined that the subjects’ favorable reaction to the similar
attitude other was largely unconscious.122 The subjects did not consciously assess the woman
who shared their attitudes as genetically related to them. Attitude similarity is simply a
component of an unconscious heuristic mechanism that gives rise to perceptions of kinship and
evokes favorable feelings toward the other individual.123 However, it must be noted that it is
unclear how powerfully and for how long shared attitudes evoke favorable feelings and possible
favorable treatment.124
Although researchers need to conduct further studies on the effects of various kinship
cues, the research completed to date has potential implications for foster care placement policy.
Foster care presents risks for children such as maltreatment and low parental investment.125
121 Id. at 164-67.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 167. See also Jerry M. Burger et al., What a Coincidence! The Effects of Incidental
Similarity on Compliance, 30 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 35 (2004) (raising the
possibility that prosocial behavior evoked by superficial similarities may constitute only a
fleeting sense of attraction and that additional research needs to be conducted in order to
determine the limits of the effect).
125 See Anne Case et al., Educational Attainment of Siblings in Stepfamilies, 22 EVOLUTION &
HUM. BEHAV. 269 (2001) (research findings indicate low parental investment in foster children
in comparison to investment in biological children who reside in the same household); Mary I.
Benedict et al., Types and Frequency of Child Maltreatment by Family Foster Care Providers in
an Urban Population, 18 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 577 (1994); Jill Chaifetz, Listening to Foster
Children in Accordance with the Law: The Failure to Serve Children in State Care, 25 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 7 (1999) (noting high incidences of abuse and neglect within foster
care); National Working Group to Improve Child Welfare Data, Child Maltreatment in Foster
Care: Understanding the Data, CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA HIGHLIGHTS, October,
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Thus, it may be desirable to secure placements in which foster parents are likely to favor the
biologically unrelated children in their care.126 If so, caseworkers would benefit from having
tools that allow them to match a particular foster child with a foster parent who is more likely to
favor that child. Kinship cues may constitute one such tool.
For example, by placing a foster child with a foster parent who has similar facial features,
a caseworker may evoke unconscious perceptions of kinship and favorable treatment.127 (This
strategy may be especially effective with foster fathers because men are more influenced by
facial resemblance.128 This is important because most incidents of child maltreatment in foster
care are perpetrated by men.)129 Similarly, a caseworker may be able to evoke favorable
treatment for a foster child by matching some of the child’s attitudes with those of the foster
parent.130 In summary, child welfare agencies may be able to use knowledge of kinship cues in
order to enhance foster child safety and wellbeing.
A possible characteristic that may serve as a rough, partial proxy for facial resemblance
and attitude similarity is race.131 Skin color or tone may be a factor an individual considers in
2002 (asserting that the incidence of maltreatment in care is relatively low, but that it is a
significant problem that is difficult to measure).
126 It is important to note that this article does not address kinship foster care placements.
127 Facial Resemblance, supra note 2.
128 See Platek et al., supra note 96; Platek et al., supra note 113. But see DeBruine, supra note
108 (presenting research findings that indicate that men and women are equally affected by
perceptions of facial resemblance).
129 See James A. Rosenthal et al., A Descriptive Study of Abuse and Neglect in Out-of-Home
Placement, 15 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 249 (1991).
130 Attitude Similarity, supra note 2.
131 See id., at 408-09; Facial Resemblance, supra note 2, at 388-90.
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assessing facial similarities. Other facial features that correlate with race may also be relevant to
an assessment of similarity.132 In addition, some attitudes possessed by both children and adults
may correlate with race.133
Of course, race does not invariably indicate facial resemblance or attitude similarity, but
on average, individuals who share racial features may be more likely to perceive each other as
similar.134 Conversely, individuals of different races may be more likely to perceive each other
as dissimilar.135 The likelihood of these perceptions of similarity and dissimilarity allows one to
reasonably speculate that two individuals of different races are less likely to perceive each other
as kin than are two individuals of the same race and that two individuals of the same race are
more likely to perceive each other as kin than are two individuals of different races.
132 See Robert W. Livingston & Marilynn B. Brewer, What Are We Really Priming? Cue-Based
Versus Category-Based Processing of Facial Stimuli, 82 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5
(2002); Leslie A. Zebrowitz & Joann Montepare, The Ecological Approach to Person
Perception: Evolutionary Roots and Contemporary Offshoots, in EVOLUTION AND SOC.
PSYCHOL. 97 (Mark Schaller et al. eds., 2006).
133 Within American Society, the formation of attitudes that correlate with race may occur
relatively early in childhood. See generally Daphne Blunt Bugental, Acquisition of the
Algorithms of Social Life: A Domain-Based Approach, 126 PSYCHOL. BULL. 187 (2000); Reid
Hastie & Nancy Pennington, The O.J. Simpson Stories: Behavioral Scientists’ Reflections on the
People of the State of California v. Orenthal James Simpson, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 957, 972-74
(1995); Reid Hastie, Emotions in Jurors’ Decisions, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 991, 996-97 (2001);
John M. Broder, Amid Criticism of Federal Efforts, Charges of Racism Are Lodged, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 5, 2005, at A9;; Todd S. Purdum & Marjorie Connelly, Support for Bush Continues to
Drop as More Question His Leadership Skills, Poll Shows, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2005, at A18.
134 See generally Zebrowitz & Montepare, supra note 132; Livingston & Brewer, supra note 132.
135 See generally id.; Zebrowitz & Montepare, supra note 132.
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This reasoning provides a foundation for the formation of a hypothesis concerning race
and foster care placements.136 Because foster parents caring for a child of the same race may be
more likely to perceive the child as kin and to provide favorable care, children in non-kin, same-
race foster care placements are likely to be safer and healthier than children in non-kin, different-
race foster care placements.137
The second line of research provides stronger support for this hypothesis. Namely, social
psychologists and behavioral biologists have begun to examine the consequences of in-group
136 In formulating this hypothesis, it is important to note that there are considerable doubts
surrounding the idea that race serves as an independent kinship cue. The characteristics that
allow for categorization by race emerged relatively recently in the course of human evolution.
See TIMOTHY H. GOLDSMITH & WILLIAM F. ZIMMERMAN, BIOLOGY, EVOLUTION, AND HUMAN
NATURE 289-90 (2001). In other words, it is unlikely that individuals possessed racial features in
the environment that existed for most of human evolution. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that
humans would have developed a cognitive mechanism that relies on racial features in order to
identify kin. In addition, research indicates that racial features do not belie or signal significant
genetic similarities or differences among individuals. See id. Thus, even if differential racial
features were present in the evolutionary environment, these features would not relate to genetic
material in a way that would support the development of a kinship recognition mechanism.
Despite the likelihood that race does not serve as an independent kinship cue, race may
be related to particular kinship cues in a way that influences an individual’s perception of others
as kin or non-kin. As noted in the text above, the observation of shared racial features may
contribute to a perception of facial resemblance and a corresponding perception of kinship. In
addition, without essentializing individuals by race, it may be the case that shared racial features
signal an increased likelihood of shared attitudes on particular matters. Thus, the observation of
shared racial features may contribute to a perception of attitude similarity and a corresponding
perception of kinship.
137 Kin placements are not included because they are presumably same-race placements and they
usually involve an actual biological relationship. Based on behavioral biology research, one
could reasonably hypothesize that children will be safer in kinship placements than in non-kin
placements. Child welfare researchers have formulated this hypothesis and have begun testing it.
See Jill Duerr Berrick, Assessing Quality of Care in Kinship and Foster Family Care, 46 FAMILY
RELATIONS 273 (1997); Gary S. Cuddeback, Kinship Family Foster Care: A Methodological
and Substantive Synthesis of Research, 26 CHILD. & YOUTH SERV. REV. 623 (2004). The results
may support the increasing use and prevalence of kinship placements.
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favoritism arising from superficial similarities.138 Their research indicates that individuals
perceive and treat more favorably, at least in the short-term, those with whom they share an
attribute.139 The shared attribute does not have to be high in heritability or relate in any
consistent or strong way with kinship.140 (In this sense the attribute is considered superficial or
arbitrary.) Yet if the attribute is shared with another, and especially if it is relatively rare or
unique, it is likely to evoke favorable perceptions and behavior.141
Several experiments provide illustrations of this behavioral tendency. Kerris Oates and
Margo Wilson conducted an experiment that initially examined whether surnames operated as a
kinship cue.142 They noted that a kinship cue “can be arbitrary provided that it is statistically
associated with relatedness.”143 They hypothesized that a shared family surname may operate as
a cue of kinship, stating that “people may respond to nominal kinship cues as if they are kin
markers, and feel more inclined to help people with the same surname than those with a different
surname.”144
138 See Burger et al., supra note 124; Kerris Oates & Margo Wilson, Nominal Kinship Cues
Facilitate Altruism, 269 Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B (2002).
139 Id.; Burger et al., supra note 124.
140 See id.; Oates & Wilson, supra note 138.
141 Id.; Burger et al., supra note 124 (noting that previous work indicates that “incidental
similarities often create a sense of association between two people.” Id. at 36.
142 Oates & Wilson, supra note 138.
143 Id. at 105.
144 Id.
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Oates and Wilson also examined personal names.145 They thought it unlikely that a
shared first name would operate as a kinship cue in the absence of a shared surname or another
cue of kinship.146 (If individuals share a surname, a shared personal name could be an additional
cue of kinship because an infant is often named after another member of the family.) However,
Oates and Wilson expected shared personal names to evoke favorable treatment independent of
surnames because “almost any arbitrary marker shared in common is effective in facilitating
favoritism toward in-group members over out-group members.”147
In summary, Oates and Wilson hypothesized that individuals would be more likely to
provide assistance to another who shares both their surname and personal name in comparison to
another who shares neither of their names.148 In addition, if shared names serve primarily as
kinship cues, Oates and Wilson expected individuals to be significantly more likely to provide
assistance to another who shares only their surname in comparison to another who shares only
their personal name.149 However, if a shared name serves more as an arbitrary marker that
facilitates in-group favoritism, the experiment would not find a significant difference between
shared surnames and shared first names.150 Finally, Oates and Wilson expected individuals who
share unique or relatively unusual names to be more likely to provide assistance than those who
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 105.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 106.
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share relatively common names because unusual names would send a stronger signal of kinship
or constitute a more powerful in-group marker.151
In order to test these hypotheses, Oates and Wilson sent e-mail messages to 2,961 valid
North American addresses. The researchers varied the name of the e-mail addressee and the
e-mail sender so that the addressees could receive a message from a sender who shared both their
surname and first name, only their surname, only their first name, or neither name. The names
used for both senders and addressees fell within two categories—(1) names that are relatively
prevalent in the U.S. name census, and (2) names that are less prevalent in the name census, but
that are not rare.152
Each addressee received a standard message that requested assistance. More specifically,
the sender’s message asked the addressee to identify his or her city’s sports team mascot(s) and
its date of inception. If the addressee replied to the message within two weeks, the researchers
considered this a minor act of altruism. If the addressee failed to respond within two weeks, the
researchers considered this a lack of assistance and an absence of altruism.153
Based on the results of the experiment, the researchers found that sharing less prevalent
names elicited a higher response than sharing more common names.154 In addition, when both
names were identical there were significantly more e-mail replies than when neither name was




154 Id. at 106-07.
155 Id.
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rate when the addressee and the sender shared only a surname and when they shared only a first
name.156 However, if the researchers considered only less prevalent names (for which a shared
surname was more likely to be perceived as indicating kinship), the response rate for a shared
surname was significantly higher than for a shared first name.157 Nonetheless, a shared first
name elicited more responses than no shared names.158 Finally, the researchers noted that
women’s response rate was significantly higher than that for men, especially when the sender
and the addressee shared less prevalent names. For women, the response rate was 26.6% when
they shared both names, 12.5% when they shared a last name, 8.4% when they shared a first
name, and 3.3% when they did not share a name. For men, the response rate was 8.3% when
they shared both names, 6.3% when they shared a surname, 2.6% when they shared a first name,
and 1.5% when they did not share a name.159
The results indicate that shared names evoke favorable treatment, with the strongest
reaction to shared surnames. This latter finding indicates that shared surnames give rise to
perceptions of kinship.160 However, shared first names also evoke favorable treatment. This
result indicates either that there is an inclination to view another individual as kin based on
similarities that do not logically signal genetic relatedness or that sharing any superficial attribute
156 Id. at 107-08.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 107. The researchers speculated that women in North American societies are more




with another will give rise to in-group favoritism.161 The first possibility indicates a strong
tendency to view non-kin as kin—in other words to make a false-positive error. (Behavioral
biology researchers have provided theoretical support for such a tendency in relation to heuristic
kinship cues developed under certain evolutionary conditions.162) The second possibility
indicates a tendency to favor others who share some superficial attribute whether or not it gives
rise to perceptions of kinship.163
The attribute of race may operate consistent with this second possibility. Even if race
does not give rise to perceptions of kinship, it may evoke favorable treatment among those who
share a particular racial category.164 This may be especially true for individuals who are
members of a minority race within their community.165 In this context, race may be analogous to
sharing a less prevalent first name.
Researchers have conducted additional experiments on superficial similarities that may
support a hypothesis concerning race and in-group favoritism. For example, a team of
researchers conducted a set of experiments in which some subjects believed they shared a
birthday, a first name, or unusual fingerprint characteristics with another person.166 In each
161 Id.
162 See Park et al., supra note 102; Hudson Kern Reeve, The Evolution of Conspecific
Acceptance Thresholds, 133 AM. NATURALIST 407 (1989).
163 See Oates & Wilson, supra note 138, at 105-06.
164 See Zebrowitz & Montepare, supra note 132, at 96-97.
165 See Oates & Wilson, supra note 138; Burger et al., supra note 124 (indicating that an attribute
shared with another is more likely to evoke prosocial behavior if it is less prevalent within the
relevant population).
166 Burger et al., supra note 124.
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experiment, the researchers asked subjects to provide assistance to another person participating
in the experiment. The results of each experiment supported the hypothesis that sharing a
superficial characteristic with someone who requests assistance evokes favorable treatment. In
the experiment using birthdays, 62.2% of the subjects who shared a birthday with the person who
asked for assistance agreed to help her with a paper assignment while only 34.2% of subjects
who did not share a birthday with the requester agreed to provide assistance.167 In the
experiment using first names, a participant asked each subject to donate money to the Cystic
Fibrosis Foundation. The subjects who shared a first name with the participant gave an average
donation of $2.07, whereas the subjects who did not share a first name with the participant gave
an average donation of $1.00.168 In the experiment using fingerprint characteristics, a researcher
told one group of subjects that they shared an uncommon fingerprint type with another person, a
second group of subjects that they shared a common fingerprint type with another person, and a
third group of subjects nothing about their fingerprints. The researchers then asked each subject
to provide assistance to the other person on a paper assignment. The findings revealed that
82.1% of the subjects who shared uncommon fingerprints agreed to provide assistance, 54.8% of
the subjects who shared common fingerprints agreed, and 48.3% of the subjects told nothing
about fingerprints agreed to assist.169
167 Id. at 38.
168 Id. at 39.
169 Id. at 40.
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It is possible that race may constitute a superficial characteristic akin to birth date, first
name, or fingerprints.170 If so, sharing race with another person may evoke favorable treatment,
especially if one shares membership in a minority race.
To summarize, behavioral biology and social psychology research provide a basis for the
formation of a hypothesis concerning race and foster care placements. Race may contribute to
perceptions of kinship that arise from cues such as facial resemblance or attitude similarity.171 In
addition, race may be a superficial attribute that gives rise to in-group favoritism.172 Therefore,
one may reasonably expect non-kin foster parents to be more likely to perceive foster children of
the same race either as kin or as members of an in-group whom they are inclined to favor. And
when examining a large population of foster children, one may reasonably expect that, overall,
foster parents would treat foster children of the same race more favorably than foster children of
a different race. This favorable treatment would likely result in better outcomes for same-race
foster children in terms of child safety (e.g., lower rate of maltreatment) and wellbeing (e.g.,
healthier attachments and family bonds, less mental health problems, better educational
performance, less delinquency).173
Of course, the research also gives rise to a converse expectation. Foster parents are less
likely to perceive different-race foster children as kin or as members of an in-group. Therefore,
foster parents in this placement context may be inclined to provide their foster children with less
170 See Zebrowitz & Montepare, supra note 132, at 96-97.
171 See notes 96-137 supra and accompanying text.
172 See notes 138-70 supra and accompanying text.
173 For a general discussion of safety and wellbeing measures that researchers consider relevant
to an assessment of the quality of care provided in foster care placements, see Cuddeback, supra
note 137, at 627-32.
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favorable treatment. Such an inclination may result in worse outcomes for different-race foster
children.
It is interesting to note that the hypothesis formulated in this article is similar to a
hypothesis concerning stepparent care formulated by Martin Daly and Margo Wilson.174 Daly
and Wilson based their hypothesis on evolutionary theory and behavioral biology research.175
Because stepparents are not genetically related to their stepchildren, one would expect
stepparents, overall, to make a relatively low investment in stepchildren.176 By conferring
benefits on a stepchild, a stepparent would only incur a cost in terms of the stepparent’s own
reproductive success. The stepparent may receive a benefit related to this cost if his or her effort
increased the likelihood of mating success with the stepchild’s biological parent. But Daly and
Wilson reasoned that the indirect mating strategy benefit provided by investment in stepchildren
would be significantly less than the direct reproductive benefit provided by biological
children.177 Thus, in comparison to a biological parent’s treatment of his or her child, a
stepparent would be less inclined to provide favorable treatment to a stepchild.
Daly and Wilson tested their hypothesis by examining the most severe cases of parental
failure—those involving child death as a result of parental maltreatment.178 An examination of
174 MARTIN DALY & MARGO WILSON, THE TRUTH ABOUT CINDERELLA (1998).
175 Id.; Martin Daly & Margo Wilson, Discriminative Parental Solicitude: A Biological
Perspective, 42 J. MARRIAGE & THE FAM. 277 (1980).
176 Id.; DALY & WILSON, supra note 174.
177 See id.; Sievert Rowher, et al., Stepparental Behavior as Mating Effort in Birds and Other
Animals, 20 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 367 (1999).
178 MARTIN DALY & MARGO WILSON, HOMICIDE (1988); Martin Daly & Margo Wilson, An
Assessment of Some Proposed Exceptions to the Phenomenon of Nepotistic Discrimination
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the data collected in cases of child death supported their hypothesis. The rate of child death at
the hands of a stepparent is much higher than the rate of child death at the hands of a biological
parent.179 The researchers concluded that children who live with a stepparent or another
unrelated adult are much more likely to experience serious maltreatment than children living
exclusively with one or both of their biological parents.180
Although this finding was not a complete surprise, it cut against a popular, hopeful view
concerning the parity of stepparents and biological parents. This view arose from an effort to
remove a stigma surrounding stepfamilies.181 Following Daly and Wilson’s work, policymakers
may still want to pursue this agenda, but they may be able to more fully consider the risks posed
to stepchildren. If considered seriously, Daly and Wilson’s research would likely impact child
protection policies, possibly leading to adjustments in risk assessment protocols applicable to
child maltreatment investigations and in the level of support services provided to stepfamilies.182
Such adjustments may result in improvements to stepchild safety and wellbeing.
Although stepfamilies differ from foster families in important ways that may have
implications for the level of parental investment,183 both family situations raise reasonable
Against Stepchildren, 38 ANNALES ZOOLOGICI FENNICI 287 (2001) [hereinafter Nepotistic
Discrimination]. 
179 Id.; DALY & WILSON, HOMICIDE, supra note 178.
180 Id.; Nepotistic Discrimination, supra note 178. See also Patricia G. Schnitzer & Bernard G.
Ewigman, Child Deaths Resulting From Inflicted Injuries: Household Risk Factors and
Perpetrator Characteristics, 116 PEDIATRICS 687 (2005).
181 See Jones, supra note 2, at 1238.
182 See id. at 1234-36.
183 Foster parents do make a conscious decision to invest in caring for a child. They are not
engaged in a mating strategy similar to that of stepparents. Related to this point, it is important
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concerns about parental investment by adults who are not biologically related to the children in
their care.184 These concerns not only provide a basis for the formulation of hypotheses about
foster care conditions and outcomes, but also call for the testing of these hypotheses. The results
of such research may have significant implications for foster care placement policies and
practices, just as Daly and Wilson’s test of their hypothesis concerning stepfamilies has
implications for public policies related to child protection.185
The test of the specific hypothesis formulated in this article would entail a comparison of
child outcomes for non-kin, same-race foster care placements with those for non-kin, different-
race foster care placements. If the hypothesis is true, one would expect a lower rate of
maltreatment for foster children in same-race placements than that for foster children in
different-race placements. One would also expect children in same-race placements to perform
better than children in different-race placements on measures of child wellbeing such as
to note that foster parents’ decision to provide care for a child may not be as strong as that of
adoptive parents whom Daly and Wilson expressly recognize as presenting a different situation
than stepparents. DALY & WILSON, supra note 175, at 282-83. (The data on child deaths reveal
that children living with adoptive parents are not maltreated at a higher rate than children living
with biological parents. See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig & Steven L. Nock, How Much Does Legal
Status Matter? Adoptions By Kin Caregivers, 36 FAM. L.Q. 449, 462-63 (2002).) Parents who
adopt a child are making a long-term commitment to a particular child that calls for a conscious
decision to heavily invest in the adopted child. In contrast, adults who decide to provide foster
care make a commitment to care for a child for a limited period that will likely not extend
throughout childhood. They contract to provide temporary care and to receive financial
compensation from the state. Although the compensation is often meager, it is often part of the
foster parent’s calculation in agreeing to provide short-term care for what likely will be a series
of children living in their home. In summary, the foster care situation may be somewhat less
problematic than the stepparent situation in terms of the level of parental investment, but
somewhat more problematic than the adoptive or biological parent situation.
184 See generally DALY & WILSON, supra note 175; Schnitzer & Ewigman, supra note 180.
185 See Jones, supra note 2, at 1234-38.
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attachment, mental health, educational attainment, delinquent behavior, and social
relationships.186
The new knowledge produced by such a comparative study would likely affect
assessments of particular laws and policies. On one hand, researchers may prove the hypothesis
false with findings that indicate insignificant differences between same-race foster care
placements and different-race placements. This would mean that the MEPA prohibition on the
systematic consideration of race in making foster care placement decisions is not problematic in
terms of child safety and wellbeing. In terms of the debate surrounding MEPA, participants
could reasonably view foster care placement decisions as similar to adoption placement
decisions. In both contexts, transracial placements would not appear to present a significant risk
of harm to affected children.187 The debate could then reasonably focus on MEPA’s impact on
the racial identity and coping skills of minority children and on the composition and health of
minority communities.188
186 In considering this specific research project, it is interesting to note that researchers have
already begun examining another hypothesis about foster care—children placed in kinship
placements are likely to have better outcomes than children in non-kin foster care placements.
See Berrick, supra note 137; Cuddeback, supra note 137; Brinig & Nock, supra note 183. The
initial research efforts in this area indicate that researchers have the capacity to design and
implement comparative studies of foster care conditions and outcomes. It may be difficult to
gather the detailed data necessary for exhaustive comparative analyses, but this type of research
appears feasible. In fact, the public child welfare system appears to provide a natural setting for
applied research on theories and hypotheses related to kinship, kinships cues, and superficial
similarities. Researchers should take advantage of this setting in order to test hypotheses outside
the laboratory and to include legal scholars on the research team. See DAVID J. HERRING, Legal
Scholarship, Humility, and the Scientific Method (May 31, 2006), available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=905573.
187 See Courtney, supra note 88; Brooks & Barth, supra note 42, at 94-98; Bradley & Hawkins-
León, supra note 42, at 433-36.
188 See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
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On the other hand, research may confirm the hypothesis. This would mean that the
MEPA prohibition is problematic in terms of child safety and wellbeing in foster care. In barring
the consideration of race, MEPA would expose children to a heightened risk of maltreatment in
foster care and worse developmental outcomes. Such research findings would also support the
alleged covert agency practice of matching the race of the foster child with that of the foster
parent even if it means a delay in achieving a relatively stable foster care placement.189 By
engaging in such a practice, child welfare workers may be ensuring the safety and wellbeing of
many minority children.
At the least, research that confirms the hypothesis would provide new knowledge
relevant to the debate of MEPA and transracial placements. It would likely give rise to a new
debate—one focused on foster care placement decisions. This new debate would reveal a
tension between MEPA and the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA).190 ASFA
expressly states that its paramount concern is child safety and health.191 By prohibiting the
systematic consideration of race in making foster care placement decisions, MEPA may increase
the risk of harm faced by children in foster care. Thus, the MEPA approach may conflict, or at
least stand in tension with the paramount goal of ASFA. This type of conflict or tension begs a
difficult and controversial question—does the pursuit of a colorblind foster care placement
regime justify placing some children at an increased risk of maltreatment or other negative
189 For discussion of the longstanding practice of race matching and possible resistance to
MEPA, see Brooks et al., supra note 40, at 576-77; Brooks & Barth, supra note 42, at 87; HHS
Guide, supra note 38.





outcomes? If research supports the hypothesis formulated in this article, this difficult question is
worthy of consideration and public discussion.
Furthermore, federal officials would likely have to reconsider their constitutional
analysis.192 If the systematic consideration of race in making foster care placement decisions
significantly enhances child safety and wellbeing, state actors may have a compelling interest in
such an approach.193 In addition, the consideration of race along with the numerous other factors
that relate to a foster child’s best interests may constitute a narrowly tailored means for securing
the state’s compelling interest.194 This latter conclusion would be especially likely in the context
of placement decisions made near the time of a child’s emergency removal from parental custody
or from a foster home. The public agency must place the child at this point. Although the initial
192 See HHS Guide, supra note 38, at 4-5.
193 See generally Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (stating that a state has a duty of
the highest order to secure children’s interests and that the best interests of the child constitute a
substantial government interest for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause, but that the state
cannot accommodate and reinforce racist attitudes in pursuing this interest); Drummond v.
Fulton County Department of Family & Children’s Services, 563 F.2d 1200, 1205 (5th Cir.
1977) (finding sufficient government interest in securing the best interests of a child to allow the
consideration of race as one of many factors in making an adoption placement decision);
McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 693 F. Supp. 318, 324 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (stating that the goal of making
an adequate long-term foster care placement that provides for a foster child’s racial and cultural
needs and that is consistent with the best interests of the child is indisputably a compelling
governmental interest for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause); Hunter v. The Regents of the
University of California, 190 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding state’s interest in the operation
of a research-oriented elementary school dedicated to improving the quality of education in
urban public schools is compelling, allowing the consideration of race as one of many factors in
making admissions decisions).
194 See generally Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Drummond, 563 F.2d 1200, 1205;
Hunter, 190 F.3d 1061; Tallman v. Tabor, 859 F. Supp. 1078, 1086 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (finding
that if racial considerations are not the sole reason for placement decisions, but only one of
several factors, they do not run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause); Compos v. McKeithen,
341 F. Supp. 264, 266 (E.D. La. 1972) (finding the difficulties inherent in interracial adoption as
justifying the consideration of race as a relevant factor in adoption, but not as justifying the use
of race as a determinative factor).
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emergency placement may truly be temporary in nature (e.g., a group shelter facility), the agency
in most cases must find a relatively stable foster care placement in a timely manner.195
Therefore, any delay in placement is likely to be limited (i.e., less than 90 days) even if state
actors attempt to secure a same-race placement.196
It should be noted that this time pressure in making a foster care placement decision is
different than that typically confronted in making an adoption placement decision. In the
adoption situation, a long delay is much more feasible, and thus, likely. For example, there
would be no pressing need to remove a child from a stable, transracial foster placement.
Therefore, an agency could take its time in seeking a same-race adoptive home, letting the child
remain in foster care and forgoing an adoptive placement with different-race parents. The
resulting extended delay in achieving an adoption placement could expose the affected child to a
significant risk of harm.197
Because of this difference, the constitutional analysis would not be the same for both
placement situations. Noting the higher risk of harm to the child posed by race matching in the
adoption context, a court would be less likely to view race matching as a narrowly tailored
195 See Sigrid James et al., Placement Movement in Out-of-Home Care: Patterns and Predictors,
26 CHILD. & YOUTH SERV. REV. 185, 192-96 (2004) (articulating and verifying the child welfare
system intent to achieve an initial stable placement within 45 days).
196 This is true even within a system that regularly places children in a central shelter, then moves
them to an emergency care unit, and then moves them to the intended initial placement site. See
James et al., supra note 195; Sigrid James, Why Do Foster Care Placements Disrupt? An
Investigation of Reasons for Placement Change in Foster Care, 78 SOC. SERVICE REV. 601
(2004).
197 See HHS Guide, supra note 38; Barth, supra note 40.
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approach to securing a child’s best interests.198 In fact, as the delay lengthens and opportunities
for timely transracial adoption present themselves, the state may no longer have a strong, let
alone compelling, interest in placing the child with a same-race adoptive family.199 At this point,
the best interests of the child would likely be better served by a timely transracial adoption
placement than by an extended or permanent wait for a same-race adoption placement.200
As to the foster care placement process shortly after a child’s removal from parental
custody, the more appropriate constitutional analogy is provided by the practice of affirmative
action in the context of higher education.201 The United States Supreme Court has
acknowledged a state’s compelling interest in securing a diverse student body.202 Similarly, a
state is likely to have a compelling interest in securing child safety and wellbeing in foster
care.203 The Court has also found that the consideration of race as one factor among many in
making college admissions decisions is a narrowly tailored means for achieving the state’s
compelling interest.204 One can certainly argue that the consideration of race as one of many
198 See HHS Guide, supra note 38; Davidson M. Pattiz, Racial Preference in Adoption: An
Equal Protection Challenge, 82 GEO L.J. 2571, 2597-98 (1994).
199 See id.
200 See id.
201 See Grutter, 593 U.S. 306.
202 Id.
203 The state’s interest in child safety and wellbeing is arguably as important as its interest in
educational diversity. See generally Palmore, 466 U.S. 429, 433; Drummond, 563 F.2d 1200,
1205; McLaughlin, 693 F. Supp. 318, 324.
204 Grutter, 539 U.S. 306.
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factors in making an initial foster care placement decision is a similarly tailored means for
achieving the state’s particular compelling interest.205
In summary, if careful, rigorous research confirms the hypothesis that non-kin, same-race
foster care placements are safer and healthier than non-kin, different race placements, it would
call into question the MEPA prohibition on the consideration of race in making early foster care
placement decisions. MEPA would conflict with the paramount goal of federal child welfare
law—securing child safety and health.206 In addition, such research findings would likely
support the constitutionality of a public agency’s systematic consideration of race in making
early foster care placement decisions.207 In the end, this research would encourage serious
discussion and consideration of laws, policies, and practices that allow race matching in foster
care.
V. Conclusion
Based on behavioral biology and social psychology research addressing kinship cues and
superficial similarities that give rise to in-group favoritism, one can formulate a hypothesis that
non-kin, same-race foster care placements may be safer and healthier for children than non-kin,
different-race placements. Because such a hypothesis may have significant implications for
laws, policies, and practices related to foster care placement decisions, it is worthy of serious
investigation. At its core, this investigation should entail a careful collection of data on
205 See generally Drummond, 563 F.2d 1200; Tallman, 859 F. Supp. 1078; Compos, 341 F. Supp.
264.
206 See supra notes 190 and 191 and accompanying text.
207 See supra notes 192-205 and accompanying text.
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maltreatment in foster care and other measures of foster child wellbeing. Such data would allow
researchers to engage in a detailed analysis comparing non-kin, same-race foster care placements
with non-kin, different-race placements.
Ideally, an interdisciplinary research team would pursue this line of inquiry.208 This team
would include a behavioral biologist, a social psychologist, a social work scholar, and a legal
scholar. Together they could design and implement a research project to test the hypothesis
formulated in this article, effectively extending laboratory research on kinship cues and in-group
favoritism to field research conducted within the context of a natural experiment—foster care.
The legal scholar could communicate the research results to legal decisionmakers and
policymakers, hopefully spurring a serious public discussion of the consideration of race in
making foster care placement decisions. Such a discussion could provide significant benefits to
many children who enter foster care, especially the substantial number who end up spending a
substantial portion of their childhood in a foster home.
208 See Herring, supra note 186.
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